Is the Chinese state-owned shipping company Cosco a security risk? Why the ...

Is the Chinese state-owned shipping company Cosco a security risk? Why the German government halted the takeover of Zippel – a creative image on the topic, created with AI: Xpert.Digital

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Supply chains under control: The geopolitical implications of the Zippel blockade

Hinterland logistics: How Cosco could endanger Germany's transport routes

Hinterland logistics: How Cosco could endanger Germany's transport routes

The German government's decision to prohibit the acquisition of an 80 percent stake in the Hamburg-based logistics company Zippel by the Chinese state-owned shipping company Cosco represents a significant turning point in German investment policy. This development goes beyond a mere conflict over Chinese capital in the Port of Hamburg and touches upon fundamental questions regarding the management of investments in an open economy. While economic considerations such as market and short-term efficiency gains have traditionally been paramount, it is now becoming increasingly clear that strategic dependencies, access to information, and potential interference in critical supply chains are also of crucial importance. With its decision, the German government has set a clear priority: competitive safety is not synonymous with security safety. This distinction is central to understanding the current geopolitical climate and the challenges facing Germany in shaping its economic relationships while simultaneously safeguarding its national security interests. In this context, it becomes clear that an open economy also bears the responsibility of protecting its strategic resources and infrastructure to remain capable of acting in times of crisis.

The price of strategic naivety: Why Germany is blocking Cosco's access to hinterland logistics

Those who control supply chains no longer need to close borders in a crisis

Those who control supply chains no longer need to close borders in a crisis

The German government's decision to prohibit the acquisition of an 80 percent stake in the Hamburg-based logistics company Zippel by the Chinese state-owned shipping company Cosco marks a turning point in German investment policy. This development is far more than just another conflict over Chinese capital in the Port of Hamburg. It touches upon the fundamental question of how an open economy deals with investments that may appear economically sound but simultaneously create strategic dependencies, access to information, and potential interference in critical supply chains. In this complex environment, it is no longer sufficient to focus solely on market , prices, and short-term efficiency gains. What matters is who, in a crisis, possesses actual transport capacity, operational data, priorities, and alternative options.

Economically, the ban cannot be convincingly explained as either a blanket rejection of Chinese investment or a mere expression of geopolitical distrust. Rather, the measure reflects a changed assessment of infrastructure and logistics. Transport networks are no longer considered merely neutral service markets, but strategic systems whose functionality determines industrial production, energy supply, military mobility, and social stability. Hinterland logistics, the connection between seaports and inland regions, is of particular importance in this context. No matter how efficient a port may be, if containers, vehicles, spare parts, or militarily relevant goods cannot reliably reach the hinterland, the transshipment at the quayside loses a significant portion of its economic and strategic value.

The German government has thus set a clear priority. Competitive safety is not synonymous with security policy safety. This distinction is crucial because it explains why the Federal Cartel Office was able to approve the acquisition, while the Federal Government subsequently blocked it. Both decisions are based on different criteria. The Cartel Office examined whether the merger would significantly impair effective competition. The investment review, on the other hand, focused on public order, security, resilience, and strategic capability. The fact that both reviews reached different conclusions is therefore not a contradiction, but rather an expression of a division of labor in the economic system.

A small market can be strategically important

Zippel is not a corporation on the scale of a global shipping company and, according to publicly available information, does not hold a dominant of the overall German logistics market. The company employs around 350 people and organizes transport by rail, inland waterway, and truck, primarily from the ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven to the German and European hinterland. At first glance, one might therefore get the impression that a company of this size could hardly generate systemic risks. However, this view is too simplistic, because overall economic significance does not arise solely from national market shares.

In network industries, position within the system is often more decisive than absolute size. A comparatively small provider can have significant influence at individual hubs, on specific routes, or for specialized services. Reports indicate that Zippel achieves high throughput shares at individual terminals in Berlin, Schkopau, and Elsterwerda. Such regional concentrations are more important for risk assessment than a small market in the overall market. Companies with established processes, personnel, contracts, and operational experience at selected interfaces between port, rail, and road can be difficult to replace in certain supply chains at short notice.

Furthermore, the company plays a role in transport operations that may be relevant to the German Armed Forces and NATO. Military logistics requires not only vehicles and railway lines, but also well-established processes, available time slots, reliable partners, precise route knowledge, and the ability to prioritize capacities at short notice. A company does not need to be formally classified as critical infrastructure to fulfill a security-relevant function in practice. Traditional regulations often work with thresholds, industry lists, and formal categories. However, the reality of modern supply chains is more fragmented. Criticism can arise from a combination of location, specialization, data access, and a lack of short-term replaceability.

This is precisely where the economic peculiarity of the case lies. The potential damage is measured not only by normal business operations, but also by the consequences of a rare yet severe crisis scenario. Such risks are similar to insurance against extreme events. In everyday life, such precautions incur costs or prevent efficiency gains. In a crisis, however, they can prevent damage that far exceeds the lost benefits. A dispassionate assessment must therefore consider both the probability of occurrence and the extent of the damage.

Competition and safety measure various things

The approval by the Federal Cartel Office was based on a sound competition-economic logic. Cosco primarily operates in maritime transport, while Zippel organizes the onward transport of containers between seaports and inland waterways. The companies thus occupy predominantly different stages of the value chain. A classic case of horizontal market narrowing, where two direct competitors merge and thereby reduce competition, was not the primary concern. Likewise, from an antitrust perspective, there was apparently insufficient evidence to suggest that other shipping companies would be significantly excluded from access to freight forwarding services or that competing freight forwarders would be noticeably excluded from shipping companies' customers.

This analysis is correct, but deliberately limited. Antitrust law primarily addresses the question of whether market power is created vis-à-vis customers, suppliers, or competitors. Security policy, on the other hand, asks whether control, influence, or access to information grows in a way that makes the state vulnerable in a crisis. A merger can be harmless from a competitive perspective but strategically problematic. Conversely, a transaction can be inconspicuous from a security policy perspective but significantly weaken competition. Both dimensions must be examined separately and then integrated politically.

In the case of Cosco and Zippel, vertical integration comes into play. A shipping company that not only organizes ocean transport but also gains access to terminals, hinterland transport, warehousing, and customer data can better manage its entire supply chain. This can reduce costs, shorten waiting times, stabilize capacity, and offer customers comprehensive solutions. From a business perspective, this is attractive. Large shipping companies worldwide are pursuing precisely this strategy because pure ocean freight is cyclical, capital-intensive, and highly price-dependent. Additional logistics services create more stable revenues and stronger customer relationships.

However, this same integration can also increase dependencies. A corporation that controls multiple levels not only gains greater efficiency but also more data, negotiating power, and influence over operational priorities. For a private company, this would primarily be a matter of competition. For a state-controlled corporation from a geopolitical rival, an additional security problem arises. The buyer's economic rationale and the strategic interests of its state then become inextricably linked.

The real power begins behind the harbor

Public debate maritime infrastructure often focuses on container terminals, quays, and docks. However, a port's performance is also determined by its hinterland. Hamburg is Europe's leading rail port. In 2025, approximately 44.4 million tons of goods and 2.6 million standard containers were transported via the port railway. Roughly half of the hinterland containers arrive at or leave the port by rail. These figures demonstrate that rail connections are not merely an add-on, but a crucial element of the business model.

For German industry, such connections are of considerable importance. Machine manufacturers, chemical companies, automotive producers, trading companies, and medium-sized exporters require reliable transit times between production sites and seaports. Disruptions in the hinterland quickly lead to overcrowded terminals, a shortage of empty containers, interrupted production processes, and rising storage costs. The economic repercussions spread along the entire supply chain. A delayed container is not just a logistical problem; it can cause missing intermediate products, contractual penalties, production stoppages, and a loss of customer confidence.

Against this backdrop, Zippel's position is more strategic than an isolated view of the company might suggest. The company connects various modes of transport and possesses long-established market knowledge. This includes timetables, capacity patterns, bottlenecks, customer demographics, alternative routes, terminal operations, and operational priorities. Such information is economically valuable because it enables more precise management. It is also relevant to safety, revealing which nodes are particularly sensitive, which industries depend on specific connections, and how quickly capacity can be shifted.

Controlling a logistics company therefore means more than just access to vehicles or contracts. It provides insight into the behavior of a network. Modern logistics is data-driven. Booking information, shipment histories, customer profiles, capacity data, and disruption reports combine to create a detailed picture of business activities. In a crisis, this knowledge can help identify bottlenecks, influence priorities, or exploit vulnerabilities. The security value of such data increases when civilian and military transport chains use the same hubs and service providers.

Cosco's size changes the risk calculation

Cosco is not your average foreign mid-sized company, but one of the world's largest integrated shipping and port groups. At the end of 2025, the publicly listed holding company operated a fleet of approximately 590 container ships with a capacity of around 3.6 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units). Its affiliated port business operated in 40 ports, managed 387 berths, and achieved a total throughput of nearly 153 million TEUs in 2025. These dimensions demonstrate that the planned acquisition of Zippel was not simply providing additional capital to a German logistics company, but integrating it into a global network.

Such a network can offer significant advantages. Zippel might have gained access to freight volume, investment capital, digitalization expertise, and international customer acquisition. More predictable volumes could improve the utilization of trains and trucks. Larger investments in vehicles, software, depots, or lower-emission transport solutions would have been conceivable. For employees and regional locations, a financially strong owner can create stability, provided they invest for the long term and don't simply integrate the company into an internal corporate structure.

At the same time, the larger the acquiring company, the greater its ability to coordinate decisions along the entire supply chain. Cosco transports containers by sea, holds stakes in port facilities, and is expanding its presence in logistics. In Hamburg, the group already owns a 24.99 percent stake in the Tollerort container terminal. A majority takeover of Zippel would have extended its influence from the maritime access point into the hinterland. This combination is more significant from a security policy perspective than any single stake alone.

The risk, therefore, lies less in an immediate disruption of transport. A profitable corporation has a strong interest in reliable services under normal operating conditions. The problematic aspect is rather the option that arises from ownership. Majority ownership grants influence over investments, personnel, IT systems, data storage, collaborations, and strategic direction. Even if these options are not abused for years, their mere existence alters the dependency. From an economic perspective, this is a unilateral course of action, the value of which increases during periods of political tension.

Efficiency gains come at a geopolitical price

Proponents of foreign acquisitions rightly point out that open capital markets can promote productivity and growth. Foreign investors bring financing, management expertise, technology, international networks, and market access. As an export-oriented economy, Germany has a particular interest in not carelessly restricting freedom of investment. Those who expect open markets abroad must also maintain credible openness at . Excessive or politically arbitrary control could deter investors, depress company valuations, and increase the cost of necessary transformation projects.

The Zippel case, however, demonstrates that openness should not be confused with strategic indifference. Potential efficiency gains are only beneficial to the economy as a whole if the associated risks are adequately considered. Companies primarily calculate their operating returns. However, they do not automatically bear all the macroeconomic costs that could arise in a crisis. If a change of ownership increases the vulnerability of military or industrial supply chains, the potential damage affects far more actors than just the buyer and seller. Economists refer to such cases as externalities.

These externalities justify government intervention, provided the risk is concrete, the measure proportionate, and the decision transparent. The government must avoid categorically classifying every Chinese investment as a threat. A new factory, a research facility, or a minority stake without controlling rights may be assessed differently than a majority takeover of a company with access to sensitive supply chains. The correct dividing line is not simply between China and the rest of the world, but between uncritical capital and strategic control.

The prohibited 80 percent stake would have given Cosco a clear majority. This distinguishes the case significantly from the stake in the Tollerort terminal, which was limited to 24.99 percent and subject to restrictions. Minority stakes can create economic incentives without transferring complete control. However, they are not automatically risk-free if they create information rights, veto positions, or long-term dependencies. The decisive factor is the overall package of stake size, governance, data access, and operational role.

Germany's dependence on China remains a contradiction

The political hardline stance against the planned takeover stands in stark contrast to the continued economic ties with China. In 2025, China was once again Germany's most important trading partner, with a merchandise trade volume of €251.8 billion. Germany imported goods worth €170.6 billion from China, while exports to China fell to €81.3 billion. The German trade surplus thus reached €89.3 billion. The dependence is particularly strong in data processing equipment, electrical and optical products, electrical equipment, and machinery.

This development shows that the much-discussed de-risking has so far only had a limited impact on trade flows. Germany is attempting to reduce strategic risks while its import dependency in key product groups continues to grow. This is not proof of policy failure, as supply chains cannot be shifted quickly and without cost. However, it clearly illustrates how selective the risk reduction efforts to date have been. Individual acquisitions can be prevented, while structural dependencies in intermediate goods, electronics, batteries, and solar technology remain.

This is precisely why precise prioritization is necessary. Germany cannot and should not reduce all economic relations with China. Complete decoupling would be extremely costly economically, would weaken the competitiveness of many industries, and could create new dependencies on other supplier countries. A risk-based approach is more sensible. In sectors with high substitutability, low strategic importance, and transparent market structures, economic openness should take precedence. However, in the case of critical infrastructure, military relevance, sensitive data, or monopolistic shortages, security must be given greater weight.

The Zippel case fits this pattern in principle. The state is not restricting trade in Chinese goods, nor is it prohibiting all cooperation with Cosco. Rather, it is preventing a change of control in a company whose operational role may extend beyond its normal market value. This distinction is important so that de-risking does not become a cover for protectionism.

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The challenges facing German SMEs in international competition

The middle class needs more than a ban

An investment ban solves the immediate security problem, but not automatically the economic issues of the affected company. If a medium-sized logistics company is looking for a financially strong buyer, the reasons could be succession planning, investment needs, digitalization, fleet renewal, or international scaling. If the preferred buyer is excluded, the capital requirement remains. Therefore, the state must not stop at defense but must address the structural causes that make strategically important companies vulnerable to foreign takeovers.

Germany has a large capital market, but long-term growth capital for medium-sized infrastructure and logistics companies is often harder to obtain than debt financing. Banks finance predictable investments but are more hesitant when it comes to high-risk transformation projects. Private equity investors usually demand high returns and often plan for a later resale. Strategic European buyers, on the other hand, may be limited by weak balance sheets, their own transformation costs, or antitrust restrictions. State-affiliated investors from third countries, however, often operate with a long-term perspective, favorable financing, and a clear industrial strategy.

If Germany excludes certain buyers for security reasons, it must therefore facilitate alternative ownership and financing models. These could include participation by German or European infrastructure investors, long-term fund models, consortia of logistics companies, public-private partnerships, or temporary government guarantees. The goal should not be permanent nationalization. The aim is to create a functioning market for strategically sound growth capital.

Otherwise, a problematic asymmetry arises: The state prohibits a sale but then abandons the company to its own devices, grappling with its investment and succession problems. In the long run, this could weaken jobs, innovation, and competitive position. While security policy would then be consistent in the short term, it would be incomplete from an industrial policy perspective. A robust strategy must combine both: protection from risky control and access to capital for necessary modernization.

Resilience is not a synonym for self-sufficiency

In political debates, resilience is often used imprecisely. A supply chain is not resilient simply because it is organized exclusively at the national level. It is resilient when it can withstand disruptions, activate alternatives, and maintain its core functions. This requires redundancy, diversification, transparent dependencies, sufficient capacity reserves, and proven contingency plans. National ownership can be helpful in this regard, but it does not guarantee resilience.

Even a German company can, for cost reasons, maintain insufficient reserves, use outdated IT, or be dependent on a single foreign technology provider. Conversely, a foreign investor can increase security of supply by creating additional capacity and accepting binding safeguards. Ownership is therefore an important, but not the only, risk factor. The German government should not treat the Zippel case as a substitute for a comprehensive resilience policy.

For hinterland logistics, this means systematically identifying critical routes and hubs. Authorities need to know which companies operate on which routes, how quickly transport can be rerouted, where track capacity or terminals are scarce, and which IT systems are essential for operations. Equally important are regular exercises with companies, the armed forces, disaster relief organizations, railway companies, ports, and European partners. Only such tests demonstrate whether theoretical alternatives work in practice.

Resilience comes at a price. Spare capacity, alternative routes, and additional inventory appear inefficient in normal operations. For decades, logistics has been optimized for minimal inventory, high utilization, and tight time windows. This model reduces costs but increases vulnerability to disruptions. The economic challenge lies in finding an appropriate balance between efficiency and safety margins. Neither maximum just-in-time optimization nor complete self-sufficiency is sensible.

Military mobility is becoming an economic factor

The changed security situation in Europe has significantly increased the importance of military mobility. Due to its geographical location, Germany is a key transit country for NATO transports towards the eastern flank. Ports, rail corridors, roads, bridges, transshipment terminals, and private logistics companies together form the material basis for moving troops, vehicles, ammunition, and supplies. This infrastructure primarily serves civilian purposes in everyday life, but can assume a dual military function in a crisis.

From an economic perspective, this creates a special public good. Companies invest in transport capacity to generate profits in the civilian market. However, the additional availability for defense purposes has a societal benefit that cannot be fully compensated through normal market prices. If the state requires this capacity, it must ensure reliability, prioritization, and protection. This includes long-term contracts, clear requirements, appropriate compensation, and investments in robust infrastructure.

The role of private logistics providers should therefore not be considered only in times of crisis. Security-relevant companies need clear points of and predictable framework conditions. At the same time, conflicts of interest must be avoided. An owner who could be subject to political directives from a third country creates an additional risk in this environment. It is not enough to hope that commercial interests will prevent all political interference. Especially in a severe crisis, economic losses can become secondary to national objectives.

Against this backdrop, the ban on the Cosco takeover is understandable. However, it highlights the need for Germany to integrate its civilian and military logistics more closely. Defense capability doesn't begin with weapons and soldiers, but with routes, ramps, storage areas, locomotives, drivers, dispatchers, and digital systems. Those who neglect these fundamentals will only be able to fulfill their military commitments to a limited extent.

Data access is the underestimated dimension

Traditional debates infrastructure focus on physical control. However, modern logistics is increasingly driven by digital platforms, automated dispatching, real-time tracking, interfaces, and forecasting systems. This increases the strategic importance of data. A logistics company knows more than just departure times and destinations. It sees volume trends, customer relationships, seasonal patterns, delivery problems, and available alternative capacity.

Economic situation reports can be derived from such data. Increased transport of certain intermediate goods can indicate production trends. Concentrations on specific routes can reveal military or industrial activities. Information bottlenecks shows where a disruption would be particularly effective. Even if individual data sets appear innocuous, their combination can create a detailed picture.

Majority ownership potentially facilitates the integration of IT systems and group-wide data platforms. This can increase operational efficiency but also poses risks to data protection, trade secrets, and national security. Contractual assurances, separate servers, or access restrictions can mitigate these risks but require intensive monitoring and enforcement. In a global corporation with complex subsidiary structures, it is difficult for authorities to permanently track every data movement.

Therefore, investment due diligence should more clearly distinguish between physical control, operational influence, and data access. Even minority stakes can be sensitive if they grant extensive information rights. Conversely, a larger equity stake can be less risky under strict governance rules, provided there is no operational control and no access to sensitive systems. In the Zippel case, however, an 80 percent stake would have created a clear controlling position. This increased not only the theoretical but also the practical possibilities for influence.

Hamburg's port remains dependent on China

The decision against the takeover does not change the fact that Hamburg remains closely economically linked to China and Asian trade flows. In 2025, a total of approximately 8.3 million standard containers were handled in the Port of Hamburg. Asian trade is one of the most important pillars of the business. Shipping companies determine schedules, ship sizes, and port calls. A port that loses international shipping lines loses cargo handling, jobs, and added value.

This creates a real tension. Hamburg must remain attractive to global shipping companies while simultaneously preventing individual foreign players from gaining too much control over key hubs and data. A purely defensive policy could lead to investments flowing to competing ports. Rotterdam, Antwerp-Bruges, Piraeus, and other locations are fiercely competing for cargo, terminals, and logistics centers. Security requirements therefore come at an economic opportunity cost.

These costs, however, do not automatically argue against the ban. Rather, they demonstrate that Germany must accelerate its own investments. Modern terminals, efficient rail connections, digital port platforms, faster permitting processes, and competitive energy prices are the best response to the influence of financially powerful foreign corporations. A port that is self-sufficient and efficient can be more selective regarding ownership. Conversely, a structurally underfunded port becomes more dependent on strategic investors.

Hamburg therefore needs a port strategy that combines security and competitiveness. This includes clear rules for shareholdings, but also reliable public investment. If security concerns limit private capital sources, the infrastructure must not subsequently fail due to a lack of funds. Otherwise, security policy itself becomes a competitive disadvantage.

Europe needs a common protection system

National decisions can reduce risks, but they do not solve the European coordination problem. Supply chains do not end at national borders. An investor who is denied access in Germany may be able to gain similar information and influence through terminals, depots, or logistics companies in another member state. Differing testing standards create loopholes and distort competition between European locations.

The European Union has therefore further developed its rules for controlling foreign direct investment. The European approach aims to more systematically examine security-relevant investments in critical sectors and to exchange information between member states. This is fundamentally correct. However, the practical implementation will be crucial. Uniform minimum standards must not lead to a cumbersome procedure that delays unproblematic investments for months.

A European framework should define clear risk categories. These include control rights in critical infrastructure, access to sensitive data, dual military use, dependence on state-influenced investors, and the importance of individual nodes for multiple member states. At the same time, accelerated procedures are needed for clearly non-critical cases. Legal certainty is a key factor for business location decisions. Investors must be able to identify early on which transactions are eligible for approval and what conditions to expect.

Furthermore, Europe should not only examine but also develop its own investment capacity. Joint infrastructure projects, European pension and insurance funds, and specialized investment vehicles could mobilize capital for ports, rail corridors, energy facilities, and digital networks. Strategic autonomy does not arise from prohibitions alone. It requires the ability to finance necessary projects from domestic or politically reliable sources.

Open markets need credible borders

Critics might argue that the ban discriminates against Chinese companies and jeopardizes German interests abroad. This risk cannot be dismissed. Investment controls can trigger countermeasures, restrict market access, and exacerbate political tensions. Germany must therefore ensure that its decisions are legally sound, factually specific, and fundamentally neutral in their justification based on the origin of the investment.

Origin-neutral, however, does not mean risk-neutral. An investor's ownership structure, government influence, legal system, and foreign policy orientation are legitimate factors in the security assessment. A company from an allied state governed by the rule of law, with independent courts and transparent governance, can be assessed differently than a state-affiliated corporation from an authoritarian system. Crucially, these differences must be judged based on verifiable criteria and not merely on subjective feelings.

Germany should also avoid using economic security as a pretext for protecting inefficient companies. If all foreign competition is seen as a strategic threat, the pressure for reform decreases. Productivity, innovation, and the international division of labor would suffer. Investment screening must therefore not be a substitute for industrial policy, competition policy, or corporate adaptation.

In the Zippel case, the combination of majority control, an integrated logistics chain, existing Cosco stake in Hamburg, potential data access, and military relevance points to an elevated risk. These factors go significantly beyond general distrust of Chinese capital. The ban is therefore substantively justifiable, provided the official assessment is reliably documented and less restrictive measures would not have been sufficient to mitigate the risk.

The alternative would have been controlled vulnerability

Economic decisions under uncertainty can rarely be made with absolute certainty. No one can prove that Cosco would actually have used its stake in Zippel against German or European interests in a crisis. Likewise, it cannot be guaranteed that contractual safeguards would have been sufficient in the long run. Policymakers therefore had to choose between two types of mistakes: an unnecessary blockage with missed investment opportunities and approval that could later create a strategic vulnerability.

For ordinary consumer goods, the threshold for government intervention would be high. With defense-related transport structures, the balance shifts. The potential damage of a wrong decision can be considerably greater than the lost economic benefit. Moreover, once ownership has been acquired, it is politically and legally difficult to reverse. Prevention is therefore of particular importance.

The provocative, yet economically accurate, insight is this: A state doesn't have to wait until dependency is abused. Once a foreign actor has acquired strategic options, the vulnerability has already arisen. Whether the option is exercised is then no longer solely within the state's control. This very asymmetry distinguishes strategic infrastructure from ordinary assets.

This does not mean that every potential vulnerability can be avoided. Modern economies are complex and interdependent. Absolute control would be prohibitively expensive and politically undesirable. The state must focus on those points where control, low replaceability, and high vulnerability converge. Zippel appears to fall into this category, according to assessments by several federal ministries.

A strategy must be developed from the individual case

The prohibition is convincing if it is part of a consistent policy. It would be less convincing if similar risks were ignored elsewhere. Germany therefore needs a continuously updated map of strategically relevant logistics structures. This should include not only major ports and airports, but also hinterland terminals, rail operators, digital platforms, warehouses, maintenance facilities, and specialized service providers.

The assessment must be functional rather than purely formal. Thresholds and legal categories are necessary, but not sufficient. A company can fall below a certain size category and still be indispensable at a specific hub. Conversely, not every large logistics provider is automatically critical if its services are easily replaceable. Key factors are concentration, substitutability, data access, time criticality, and the consequences of a failure.

Equally important is a tiered approach to measures. Not every risky investment needs to be completely prohibited. Depending on the case, shareholding thresholds, the exclusion of veto rights, security agreements, separate IT systems, German trust models, reporting obligations, or the exclusion of specific business areas may suffice. A complete ban should only be implemented if compliance with requirements is unenforceable or the remaining risk remains too high.

Finally, transparency regarding the economic policy logic is essential. Security details can remain confidential, but criteria and procedural principles must be publicly understandable. Only in this way can investment reviews be prevented from being perceived as arbitrary political interventions. Predictability protects both national security and the investment location.

The right course is selective openness

The German government made a fundamentally correct decision in prohibiting the Cosco takeover. This wasn't because Chinese capital was inherently undesirable, but because an 80 percent stake would have transferred control over a company operating at sensitive interfaces of Germany's hinterland transport network and potentially relevant for military logistics. The company's small overall market in Germany does not diminish its importance. In networks, nodes, data, and replaceability matter more than mere revenue figures.

At the same time, it would be wrong to conclude from this case that economic relations with China should be rejected outright. Germany remains dependent on trade, investment, and international cooperation. Chinese companies can continue to make important contributions to production, employment, and transformation. The line should be drawn where access to capital becomes strategic control and where a potential disruption or political intervention could cause disproportionately high damage.

Selective openness is more demanding than blanket protectionism. It requires precise data, interdisciplinary reviews, and political resolve. It also demands a willingness to provide companies with economic alternatives after a ban. Without a European capital market, modern infrastructure, and clear governance rules, de-risking remains defensive and incomplete.

The Zippel case ultimately demonstrates that logistics has become the hard currency of geopolitical power. Whoever connects ships, terminals, rail links, data, and hinterland transport controls more than just a commercial process. They gain influence over how quickly an economy can produce, trade, and react in a crisis. Germany's decision, therefore, does not merely protect a single company from a change of ownership. It protects a strategic option that is barely visible in normal operations but can become crucial in a severe crisis.

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