North Korea's Ukraine POWs Are Now in South Korea. What Comes Next?

The immediate fate of two North Korean prisoners-of-war captured by Ukrainian forces is no longer in question, but the saga is not yet over.

Ukraine has transferred custody of the pair to South Korea in what was perhaps a predictable outcome given their reported desire not to return to North Korea. However, the circumstances surrounding the disclosure have introduced new political dynamics to the situation. Now, both the South Korean government and the two former soldiers face an unprecedented resettlement process.

Kyiv first announced that it had captured the two North Korean soldiers in January 2025, immediately prompting questions of what would come of the pair. The legal provisions surrounding their eventual disposition were complicated. International rules pointed toward repatriating them with other POWs to Russia. Before the capture happened, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was his government’s position that all POWs in Ukrainian custody would receive the same treatment.

The two soldiers, however, reportedly expressed fear of repatriation and a desire to defect to South Korea. Given the Kim Jong Un regime’s publicized insistence that soldiers kill themselves rather than be captured , returning to North Korea could have exposed them to reprisals for allowing themselves to be taken into Ukrainian custody. Under the principle of non-refoulement , the potential risk of persecution, torture, or other serious human rights violations if the soldiers were ultimately repatriated to North Korea was a necessary consideration.

The South Korean government stepped in early with offers to take the POWs into their custody. With advocacy stretching back to the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, there was little doubt over Seoul’s desired outcome for the two individuals.

What is now evident is that the two governments came to a confidential agreement to transfer the custody of the POWs. The handover reportedly took place ahead of the U.N. General Assembly debates, and the two former soldiers are now in South Korean government care. Details of this arrangement first came to light via Zelenskyy himself.

During his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, the Ukrainian president captured international attention when he revealed that Ukraine had transferred custody of the two POWs to South Korea. In the speech, he noted that “these guys are not easy to capture alive,” adding that one of the soldiers, “when he realized he was going to be taken prisoner, tried to kill himself.” Zelenskyy’s disclosure came unilaterally and without warning to the South Korean government.

Kyiv’s decision to reveal information despite the confidential arrangement created a diplomatic problem with Seoul, but it also served a clear Ukrainian purpose. Kyiv’s intelligence has repeatedly claimed that the Kremlin is seeking an additional 30,000-50,000 North Korean troops to support a new offensive. Zelenskyy therefore used the U.N. General Assembly debates as a platform to highlight the Kim regime’s continued support for Russia’s war effort and to put North Korea’s military involvement back on the international agenda.

But Zelenskyy’s announcement caused a stir in South Korean domestic politics. Opposition lawmakers immediately chastised the Lee Jae-myung administration for not disclosing the transfer. Some argued that the government was withholding details out of fear of how North Korea may react.

Lee took to social media to push back against this criticism. He said that there was an agreement to keep the transfer confidential, expressing that it was “deeply regrettable” that the Ukraine side released details on the matter. He added that publicly disclosing the successful repatriation could have helped boost approval ratings, but it would not have been right to risk “someone’s life or the national interest” for one’s “own petty benefit.”

There are political reasons why some in the Lee administration may have sought to avoid disclosing information the POW transfer. The government has been working to rekindle any form of inter-Korean engagement, and some policy groups within Seoul have warned that North Korea could react strongly to the decision.

However, such concerns may be unfounded. North Korean state media has not commented on the POWs since their reported capture, and there are much more significant sticking points between the two Koreas; namely, Pyongyang’s preconditions that Seoul must drop unification and denuclearization as policy objectives. Since Zelenskyy’s announcement, the only reporting from Pyongyang directed toward the South Korean government has been a statement attributed to Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui on a familiar issue: reiterating the Kim regime’s position that denying the reality of North Korea’s nuclear weapon status “is to give up the future.”

Meanwhile, from a security perspective, there are justifiable concerns related to the information disclosure. There have been North Korean assassination attempts against South Korea-based defectors in the past. The most prominent recent example occurred in a 2011 incident in which a North Korean agent attempted to kill prominent defector-turned-activist Park Sang-hak with a poison needle.

The two POWs could therefore present a different security challenge from the average North Korean defector. Their firsthand knowledge of North Korean involvement in the Russia-Ukraine War means that there is a reasonable risk that they could become targets of elimination efforts.

Given the confidential nature of the South Korea-Ukraine agreement, there are few details on what comes for the two former soldiers. There may have been an understanding that they will remain in custody until the conclusion of the war, or Kyiv may have conceded that South Korea can treat the individuals as they would any other defector. This would affect how long the individuals remain in the government’s custody.

Whatever the length of their initial detention in South Korea, the eventual step will be resettlement.

Resettlement can be difficult for any defector. New arrivals generally undergo a months-long program at the Hanawon resettlement facility under the Ministry of Unification’s remit, and it includes tasks such as teaching individuals South Korean customs and courtesies, how to manage bank accounts and finances, and finding employment.

Upon completion of the resettlement process, they are then given relocation assistance to a new residence somewhere in the country. There, they are typically assigned a local officer – either a Ministry of Unification, Korean National Police, or National Intelligence Service (NIS) official – to continue supporting their transition process and to in the event of any issues.

The system is different for higher profile or high-risk defectors. They may be former senior North Korean officials like Thae Yong Ho , or figures such as Park Sang-hak who have used their newfound freedom to lead civic movements in protest of the Kim regime . In those cases, the individuals can remain in NIS protective custody until officials determine that it is safe for them to return to public life. Even then, there may be continued protection services.

The two former soldiers transferred from Ukraine will likely fall into that latter category, particularly with the amount of media coverage they have received.

Thus, the arrival of the two North Korean soldiers to South Korea resolves the most immediate question surrounding their fate, but the steps remain dynamic. The situation has now entered a new phase where South Korean politics will continue to scrutinize the issue as the government works to navigate an unprecedented resettlement process.