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Russia's age-old strategy of exploiting minorities - The Loop (ECPR)

Russia's age-old strategy of exploiting minorities - The Loop (ECPR)

Theloop.Ecpr.Eu • November 2, 2026

In March this year, a Russian online campaign a fake 'Narva People’s Republic' in Estonia. It flopped. But the playbook behind it is still in use. Ibrahim Mammadli argues that Estonia can control only one step of that playbook: whether there are real grievances for Moscow to exploit. That makes integration, not tougher rules, the country’s most important security policy

In March 2026, a wave of social media posts a so-called 'Narva People’s Republic'. Narva is Estonia’s third-largest city. It sits on the Russian border, and most of its residents speak Russian as their first language. The posts demanded autonomy, self-determination and 'equal status' for the region’s Russian speakers. The name was deliberate. It echoed the 'People’s Republics' that Russian-backed separatists declared in eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Estonian intelligence and international security analysts see the campaign as a Russian 'hybrid' or 'grey-zone' operation. These are cheap, deniable attacks that fall short of open warfare. Few people in Estonia backed the campaign. Even so, it left many asking: what if it had worked?

Russia has a well-known playbook for using minorities as an excuse to intervene in other countries. Estonia controls only one step of it: whether real grievances exist for Moscow to exploit. Here, I argue that integration, not tougher restrictions, is Estonia’s most important security policy.

How Russia uses minorities as a pretext

Russia has done this before. It claims a duty to protect Russian speakers or other minorities abroad, then uses that claim to justify territorial grabs or invasions. It did so in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. It took a similar approach in South Ossetia, a breakaway region of Georgia, and in Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova.

The process usually runs in five stages:

Stoking grievances. Russian disinformation campaigns inflame real or invented complaints language laws or political rights in areas where the minority lives.

Handing out passports. Where it can, Russia gives Russian citizenship and passports to members of the minority. Analysts call this 'passportisation'. It means Moscow can later claim to be protecting its own citizens.

Creating proxies. Russia sets up online movements, political parties or armed groups. These claim to speak for the minority and to defend it against 'government violence'.

Declaring an emergency. Moscow announces a 'humanitarian' crisis. It claims its 'compatriots' or citizens face immediate danger.

Intervening. Russia takes direct or indirect military action to carve out territory and cut the host country off from it.

The cycle of justification

Democracy cuts both ways here. A democracy can resist this playbook by including minorities and building institutions that make them feel safe. But democratic freedoms also let minority groups build their own organisations. Outside actors can then use these organisations to push political demands, and even calls for separation.

Democratic freedoms let minority groups build their own organisations. Outside actors can then use these organisations to push political demands

Democratic freedoms let minority groups build their own organisations. Outside actors can then use these organisations to push political demands

Freedom House ranks Estonia among the most democratic countries in Europe. But do these rankings reflect everyday life for Estonia’s Russian speakers?

Does Estonia discriminate against its Russian minority?

Russian speakers make up around a quarter of Estonia’s population. Many are the descendants of people who moved there during the Soviet period. Most live in the capital, Tallinn, and in Ida-Virumaa, the north-eastern county that includes Narva. Russia’s manipulation is well documented. But we should also ask whether this community has real reasons to feel discriminated against.

The main problems concern language and the law , rather than outright racism. Estonian is the only official language. Many jobs require a high level of Estonian. As a result, ethnic Russians face higher unemployment and poverty rates . In 2006, Amnesty International argued that these language laws amount to discrimination in practice. In its view, they shut people who are not fluent out of jobs and services.

Many jobs in Estonia require fluency in the native language. As a result, ethnic Russians face higher unemployment and poverty rates

Many jobs in Estonia require fluency in the native language. As a result, ethnic Russians face higher unemployment and poverty rates

Estonia is also moving all schools to teaching in Estonian only. Critics say this may breach minority children’s right to learn in their mother tongue. Estonian officials argue the reform will help integration and give Russian-speaking young people better prospects.

At the same time, the government funds free Estonian lessons for speakers of other languages. Bodies such as the Integration Foundation run these courses and other integration projects.

These rules clearly aim to bring Russian speakers into Estonian society. But some in the community may see them as limits on their freedom. If so, the rules could deepen grievances rather than build real integration.

What does this tell us?

The Narva campaign failed. But it shows that a more serious attempt could follow if Estonia does not act. The country is in a delicate position. Its government needs to stop tensions escalating and avoid handing Russia an excuse to claim a 'duty to protect'.

Estonia should not respond by placing more restrictions on its Russian minority. That would push the community further away and make its members feel threatened. People often view Russian speakers in north-east Estonia with suspicion. Many treat them as a security threat to be 'dealt with', as if they were the same as the Russian state.

Estonia should not respond to the Kremlin's disinformation campaigns by placing more restrictions on its Russian minority. That risks pushing the community further away

Estonia should not respond to the Kremlin's disinformation campaigns by placing more restrictions on its Russian minority. That risks pushing the community further away

Instead, Estonia needs a balanced policy. It should counter Russian narratives from outside. At the same time, it should build harmony between communities at through institutional reform and a more inclusive system.

In practice, this could mean:

investing in new industries in Narva and Ida-Virumaa

improving transport links with the rest of the country

creating public-sector jobs in the region

giving local councils, such as Narva’s, more powers and money

supporting high-quality Russian-language media funded by Estonia, such as ETV+, the public broadcaster’s Russian-language channel, as an alternative to Kremlin propaganda

setting up regular ways to consult Russian-speaking residents

organising public events and exchanges that bring the two communities together and move beyond 'us versus them'

Of the five stages in Russia’s playbook, Estonia can tackle only the first: the grievances of its Russian-speaking population. This step matters most. Addressing it denies Moscow the excuse it needs. It also makes it less likely that Russian speakers will believe the propaganda reflects their own lives. Better, more inclusive institutions, without heavy restrictions, would achieve both goals at once.

In short, integration policy is now Estonia’s security policy.

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