Three years after October 7, Iran pays the price of miscalculation

Citizens accused the authorities of prioritizing financial support for regional allies over the needs of Iranians, contrasting the reported payment with their own incomes, government subsidies and mounting household expenses.

In messages, several people described struggling to afford basic necessities, while others questioned why the Islamic Republic was directing resources abroad during Iran's economic crisis.

Hezbollah payments dwarf Iranian wages

"You give each Hezbollah family 8 billion rials, but deposit a 5000,000-rial food allowance for each Iranian and then take even that back a few hours later. This country's money belongs to its people, not Hezbollah," one citizen said.

Another compared the payments with compensation given to Iranian soldiers.

"A soldier who spent eight months under missile fire with no way to escape received seventy million rials in combat pay. Then you gave Hezbollah 8 billion rials from our money," the citizen said.

Reuters reported on October 7 , citing two people with direct knowledge, that Hezbollah received $200 million from Iran in September and planned initial payments of $3,000 per family, prioritizing approximately 50,000 families displaced by the war.

At an exchange rate of approximately 2.67 million rials per dollar on Iran's open market, $3,000 amounts to roughly 8 billion rials.

A teacher in Tehran with 18 years of experience compared the payments with his annual salary.

"My salary for an entire year is 3 billion rials, yet you gave 8 billion rials of our money to the Lebanese," the teacher said.

A local government employee with 29 years of service and a master's degree said his total monthly income was 350 million rials.

Citizens in Neyshabur and Malard also criticized the reported payments, saying the Islamic Republic was directing national resources toward allied groups abroad while Iranians faced poverty and declining purchasing power.

Islamic Republic officials have not formally confirmed the reported $200 million transfer, and the US government has rejected the account.

"Hezbollah has been decimated and caused misery for hundreds of thousands of innocent Lebanese. It is now trying to save face with fake stories cash influxes from Iran," US State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a statement. "It can claim whatever it wants, but the money is not there."

Families sell belongings to afford basic necessities

Several citizens described the financial pressures facing their families, including difficulties paying for medicine, food and other essentials.

One person said her husband and son had been forced to sell their mobile phones to cover household expenses, contrasting the family's financial difficulties with the reported funding for Hezbollah.

Another described the rising cost of medication for her father.

"I bought just three blood pressure and heart medications for my father, and they cost 85 million rials. I didn't have enough money to buy the rest of his medicines. Insulin is also unavailable. Previously, these medicines did not even cost 5 million rials," the citizen said.

Other citizens described struggling to afford food and household expenses despite receiving government subsidies and food vouchers.

One person said the authorities treated modest increases in food assistance as a financial burden while continuing to spend substantial sums supporting allied groups in Lebanon.

Anger over Islamic Republic's spending priorities

Some calculated how many Iranian households could benefit from the reported $200 million payment, arguing that the money could help tens of thousands of families struggling with living expenses.

One person directed criticism at Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei over the allocation of national resources.

"You have abandoned your own nation and are giving the Iranian people's money to the Lebanese. It is not your father's inheritance. Charity begins at ," the citizen said.

Another questioned the priorities of President Masoud Pezeshkian and his deputy, saying their public emphasis on serving Iranians conflicted with the financial support directed toward Hezbollah.

The citizen also expressed concern that such funding could contribute to continued armed conflict and civilian deaths.

Several others described the reported payment as part of the Islamic Republic's longstanding policy of financing allied armed groups across the Middle East.

Reuters reported in June that Hezbollah was awaiting additional financial support from Iran after suffering heavy losses in its war with Israel.

The US Treasury Department previously said Iran had transferred over $1 billion to Hezbollah during the first 10 months of 2025.

Zahedan governor Jamshid Rakhshani-Nasab said a vehicle belonging to a police commando unit came under fire in the Nosratabad area and that officers returned fire.

Sistan-Baluchestan police said the patrol was attacked on the main road in the Lakhshak area while carrying out a security mission. The officer killed was identified as Vahid Enayat.

Police said several attackers were wounded and fled the scene. Security forces were searching the area for those responsible, according to the statement.

Army minibus attacked on Makran coast

In a separate incident on Thursday, gunmen attacked a minibus carrying personnel from the Iranian Army’s 88th Armored Division stationed along the Makran coast, Mehr news agency reported.

The division said the personnel were traveling for a shift change when the vehicle came under fire. One person, identified as Mohammadreza Okati, was killed and three others were wounded.

Series of attacks in Sistan-Baluchestan

No group immediately took responsibility for Thursday’s attack.

The incident came three days after gunmen attacked two military vehicles in Bampur, also in Sistan-Baluchestan. Rights group Haalvsh reported at least three people killed in that attack, while Iranian state media reported lower casualty figures.

Last week, another roadside attack near Zahedan killed several people, according to differing accounts from Iranian authorities and Haalvsh. The IRGC confirmed that one of its fighters was killed in a bombing, while Haalvsh reported a higher toll and said those killed were members of the Iran-backed Fatemiyoun militia.

Repeated clashes in the southeast

The province has also seen recent fighting in Rask, Saravan and other areas, including attacks on police positions and security facilities.

Iranian authorities regularly describe armed groups operating in Sistan-Baluchestan as terrorist organizations. The province has seen repeated armed attacks, insurgent activity and clashes between security forces and gunmen in recent weeks.

Information provided to Iran International by an international intelligence agency shows that Hezbollah began contacting foreign students at Al-Mustafa International University five years ago. Those recruited have received training in weapons handling, sabotage, cyberattacks and espionage.

The recruitment operation is conducted in coordination with the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force and targets students at Al-Mustafa. The state-run institution was established 18 years ago on the orders of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and has branches in more than 60 countries.

Iran International’s sources identified Mohammad Hassan, an Indonesian national and Al-Mustafa graduate, as the person overseeing Hezbollah’s operation in Iran. Under the supervision of Quds Force commanders, Hassan works for Talal Hamiyah, head of Hezbollah’s Unit 910, the group’s external operations unit.

Under Hassan’s direction, Hezbollah’s recruits maintain numerous safe houses, known as “operations houses,” across Iran. Iran International obtained the locations of four such properties in Qom and Tehran.

Hassan uses an apartment in Kashaneh 2 Tower in Qom’s Velayat district, near Hakim and Payambar-e Azam boulevards, as a safe house for recruitment and training. In Tehran, the network uses properties on Seventh Kish Street in the Naft neighborhood, Third West Sarvestan Street in Rah Ahan and Sarv Alley off Alborz Street in Pounak.

The Quds Force and Hezbollah use the properties as cover to shelter newly recruited members, who also receive training there.

The US Treasury designated Hamiyah a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2012 for supporting Hezbollah’s terrorist activities in the Middle East and around the world. The State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offers up to $7 million for information on him.

The unit’s first commander was Imad Mughniyeh, a senior Hezbollah figure who was killed in 2008. Hezbollah’s external operations unit initially included four prominent figures: Mughniyeh, Mustafa Badreddine, Talal Hamiyah and Ahmad Vahidi, then commander of the Quds Force and now commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

After Badreddine was killed, Hamiyah took command of the unit. Mohammad Hassan is now recruiting for him in Qom.

Iran International’s sources identified cleric Habib Mustafa Zaatar as another participant in the recruitment operation. Born in Lebanon’s Jabal Amel region, he lives in Qom. The sources said Zaatar is a US citizen and travels to the United States several times a year. Zaatar teaches Sharh al-Lum‘ah and its section on hudud punishments at Qom’s religious seminary.

Serving as an adviser at the Noor Islamic Center and Hikmat International Academy in Qom, he teaches Shia religious subjects in English. Tuition for his course at Hikmat Academy is 835,000 tomans per month.

Habib Mustafa Zaatar also has close ties to the Najaf religious seminary. He is a lecturer and researcher at the Al-Abbas shrine in Iraq and has translated several well-known Shia religious books. His command of English gives him a key role in recruiting foreign nationals studying at Al-Mustafa and Qom seminaries.

Iran International also identified four people recruited by Hezbollah who have been training for years as members of a sleeper cell in Iran.

One is Mohammad Zaki Fathoni. He heads the regional leadership council of Indonesia’s Ahlul Bayt Foundation and is a member of the Al-Mustafa alumni association. He represented Indonesia at the Fourth International Congress on Nahj al-Balagha and Alawi Governance, held at Iran’s presidential complex in Tehran in fall 2025, with President Masoud Pezeshkian in attendance.

Another recruit is Ahmad Dzilal Mukhlis. He is also a member of the Al-Mustafa alumni association.

Another Indonesian national in Qom, Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Ali al-Attas, has also been recruited by Hezbollah. He heads the association of Indonesian students studying in Iran and is a member of Indonesia’s Ahlul Bayt Council. Al-Attas hosts a podcast in which he strongly supports the Islamic Republic and speaks against Israel and Zionism.

A photograph reviewed by Iran International shows al-Attas attending a government-organized Quds Day march in Qom.

The fourth Hezbollah recruit in Iran is Mohammad Saleh. He is an Al-Mustafa student and a member of a religious seminary students’ association. On January 29, 2026, Saleh met Reza Ramazani, secretary-general of the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly, as a member of the Indonesian, Thai and Malaysian religious students’ associations.

According to a photograph published by media outlets inside Iran, Saleh attended a pro-government march in September 2022, days before the protests that followed Mahsa Amini’s death, and called for compulsory hijab for Iranian women. He is active in Qom’s religious circles.

All these activities take place under the cover of Al-Mustafa, which received 1.8 trillion tomans in state funding for the Iranian year that began in March 2026.

Al-Mustafa describes its mission as educating Muslim students in other countries. The United States sanctioned the institution over alleged links to the Quds Force’s military and intelligence activities.

The warnings come as Tehran and Washington continue indirect discussions, mediated by Qatar and others, over a framework for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and ending the conflict, while military preparations and explicit threats complicate the diplomatic track.

Morteza Maki, a senior international relations analyst, wrote in Etemad newspaper that another war was not inevitable, but pressure had reached a point where “the boundary between the threat of war and the start of war has become more fragile than before.”

Ruydad24 similarly warned Wednesday that the most important message from recent developments may not be that Washington has decided to go to war, but that “the distance between the path of negotiations and the path of military escalation has once again become very short.”

Fararu described “strategic ambiguity” as one of the defining features of the current crisis, warning that contradictory claims and uncertainty over the rules of engagement could lead to miscalculation.

The Strait of Hormuz, it said, “has now reached a point where every action there is not merely a tactical move, but a strategic statement.”

Iran signals readiness to strike first

The concerns have taken on greater significance as Iranian military officials increasingly describe pre-emption as part of Tehran’s strategy.

Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akrami-Nia, an army spokesman, told Fars that Iran had carried out pre-emptive operations in the past and would do so again under the framework of self-defense if necessary.

If Iran concludes that an enemy attack is imminent, he said, it will “definitely” launch a pre-emptive operation.

Akrami-Nia described an Iranian attack on a US base in Jordan as pre-emptive and said last week that Iran had shifted its strategy toward pre-emptive warfare following the 12-day war.

The statements have added to concerns that confrontation could escalate not only through a deliberate decision to start a war, but through either side acting on the assumption that an enemy attack is imminent.

Israeli preparations draw scrutiny

Iranian media have also focused on Israeli preparations for a possible new operation against Tehran.

Ruydad24 cited warnings by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a possible Iranian attack alongside reports of Israeli military preparations as reasons the prospect of renewed conflict was being taken more seriously.

The outlet argued, however, that Iran’s ability to launch a pre-emptive attack should not be confused with an intention to do so, saying such an operation would carry significant costs for Tehran.

The possibility of an incident providing the trigger for a wider conflict has become a recurring theme in Iranian commentary.

Journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi warned that Israel could stage a false-flag operation and attribute it to Iran, or conduct such an operation through infiltrators inside the country. He urged Iranian decision-makers not to fall into what he described as Netanyahu’s trap.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei raised similar concerns Wednesday in a video alleged false-flag operations by the United States and Israel.

“False flags are an old craft: manufacture the incident, assign the blame, and harvest the consequences,” Baghaei wrote on X.

Ruydad24 warned that the greatest danger may be an ambiguous incident that sets off a wider escalation.

“The biggest danger for Tehran is not merely a direct attack; it is becoming trapped in a scenario in which a limited action, an ambiguous incident or an operation attributed to Iran becomes the pretext for another round of war,” it wrote.

War or pressure for a deal?

Despite the increasingly alarmed tone, some Iranian analysts believe a direct confrontation before the US elections remains unlikely.

Jafar Ghanadbashi, an international affairs analyst, told ILNA that “one should not expect a war before the US elections.”

He argued that the approaching elections and recent Israeli moves could instead produce efforts to create the impression that war was imminent in order to extract concessions from Iran.

That assessment offers a different reading of the military signaling: the threat of war may itself be a tool of pressure, without either side necessarily having decided to initiate another conflict.

The central concern running through Iranian commentary is not that either side has necessarily decided to start another war, but that pre-emptive military doctrines, strategic ambiguity and fears of a triggering incident have left little distance between confrontation and full-scale conflict.

The shift is a sign of the blockade’s widening impact. Iran loaded no new crude or condensate onto tankers in September, although previously exported Iranian oil continued arriving in China, according to Homayoun Falakshahi, Head of Crude Oil Analysis at Kpler.

Of nearly 90 million barrels that initially made it out, only around 10 million remain to be discharged in China, Falakshahi said.

Once those barrels and the payments for them are exhausted, Iran risks losing not only a crucial export market but one of its main sources of dollars.

Chinese refiners that once absorbed more than one million barrels per day of Iranian crude are now buying Iraq’s Basrah Heavy and Basrah Medium as they for replacement supplies.

Iran loses a crucial outlet

China’s independent refiners have long provided Tehran with a critical market for oil sold under US sanctions, drawn in part by steep discounts on Iranian barrels.

Iran loaded an average of around 250,000 barrels per day of crude and condensate in August, Falakshahi said. In September, that fell to zero.

“I think that’s the first since the revolution, actually, 1979 revolution,” he said, describing the impact of the blockade as “very much brutal.”

The turn toward Iraq shows what is happening as Iranian supply disappears: buyers that relied heavily on Tehran’s crude are finding replacement barrels elsewhere.

The financial squeeze comes

The full financial impact of the blockade has yet to reach Tehran.

Chinese buyers typically have one to two months to pay for Iranian crude, Falakshahi said, meaning payments for oil already exported could continue until around mid-December.

“After that, it’s zero revenue from oil sales,” he said, assuming the blockade remains in place.

Oil sales are Iran’s main source of foreign exchange, and despite sanctions, Falakshahi said the country is still paid mainly in dollars for its crude.

In recent years, Iran had typically generated around $2 billion to $3 billion per month from oil sales, he said. The prospect of losing those inflows is already weighing on Iran’s currency.

“The revenues have not yet dropped to zero,” Falakshahi said. “It’s just the expectation that they will drop to zero in December that is causing that.”

Once the remaining payments end, the pressure will “probably ... only accelerate,” he added.

Can Iran find another way out?

Iran has spent years developing methods to circumvent US sanctions, leaving open the possibility that some crude could still reach China through less transparent channels.

Max Meizlish, senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former US Treasury official, said the increase in Chinese purchases of Iraqi crude could be entirely legitimate, but cautioned against assuming that reported origin always establishes where the oil was produced.

Iraq has previously been used to obscure the origin of Iranian crude, he said.

“Iraqi crude has been used as a vehicle for Iran to mask the source of its crude,” Meizlish told Iran International.

“It’s entirely possible that this is a legitimate ordinary increase by China of Iraqi crude,” he added, while saying data on the source of Chinese imports should be viewed “with a little bit of skepticism or with a critical eye.”

Even if Iran does move crude through Iraq, the larger constraint is scale.

Falakshahi said transporting 50,000 to 100,000 barrels per day through Iraq could require around 5,000 trucks. At 100,000 barrels per day, Iran would be replacing only around 5% to 7% of what it previously sold by tanker.

“It would be just a portion of that,” he said.

Iran’s own response also points to the difficulty of replacing those exports.

Falakshahi said Tehran has rapidly reduced oil production toward the level needed to meet domestic demand, while 20 to 25 empty tankers remain inside the blockade zone despite being available to load crude.

During an earlier blockade, Iran continued loading tankers in apparent anticipation that restrictions would eventually ease. This time, the vessels are remaining empty.

Kpler also understands that tankers beginning to move inside the blockade zone have received radio warnings from the US Navy against continuing, Falakshahi said.

“This is something that did not happen during the first blockade,” he said.

Iran may still find ways to move smaller volumes or disguise the origin of some crude. What those workarounds have not demonstrated is an ability to replace the tanker trade being lost.

The buyers are still there. So is their demand for oil. But increasingly, the barrels they are buying are coming from somewhere else.

And as the remaining Iranian oil already at sea dwindles, the impact of the blockade is shifting from Iran’s export terminals to its finances.