Supply Chain Attack: GHAPPIER Loader Exploits npm Trusted Publishing

• •GHAPPIER loader exploited npm's trusted publishing for a supply chain attack.
• •The attack involved a 105-minute compromise of a maintainer account, leading to malicious releases.
• •CloudSEK linked GHAPPIER to the PolinRider campaign, suspected to involve North Korean actors.

On September 9, 2026, an attacker compromised the maintainer account of the npm package @dforge-core/dforge-mcp for 105 minutes, releasing a malicious loader named GHAPPIER. The attack involved two versions: 0.2.20, which failed to install, and 0.2.21, which successfully shipped the loader. The malicious release exploited npm's trusted publishing mechanism, allowing the attacker to publish without valid credentials. The loader initiated a four-stage payload chain, culminating in a self-deleting remote shell. CloudSEK traced GHAPPIER across at least 65 repositories and 22 accounts, linking it to the PolinRider campaign, suspected to be associated with North Korea. No confirmed organizational compromise has been reported, but the attack highlights vulnerabilities in trusted publishing systems. Developers are advised to pin package versions and monitor release workflows.