An Important Message: The Coming Winter in Ukraine

Ukraine has survived four winters of Russian strikes on its energy system. The fifth will likely be the hardest. Russia now fires more missiles, and more kinds of missiles, than ever before. We don’t know exactly how difficult the coming months will be for Ukraine, but forecasts look bleak. Russia, it appears, is determined to make living in Ukraine as difficult as possible for the civilian population.

This post assesses, based on open-source information, how many missiles Russia can be expected to launch, how well Ukraine’s air defenses and energy grid are prepared, and what you can do to support Ukraine’s winter preparations.

Russia’s offensive capacity

Ukraine’s biggest challenge continues to be Russia’s ballistic missiles. The latest estimate from Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) indicates that Russia currently produces around 65 M723 short-range ballistic missiles per month, used on the Iskander-M system. Russia’s Iskander-M reserve stockpile is projected to be around 115 missiles. This figure has likely declined in recent weeks following Russia’s October surge , when it launched more than 100 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in just two weeks. Production of the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile has reportedly been suspended since April, although Russia is still believed to hold a stockpile of roughly 50 missiles.

Depending on the accuracy of HUR’s production and stockpile estimates, and on whether Russia is willing to largely deplete its Iskander-M and Kinzhal stockpiles over the winter, it could plausibly launch between 360 and 440 ballistic missiles at Ukraine over the four months. S-400 surface-to-air missiles fired in ground-attack mode will likely add another 60 to 200 ballistic missile projectiles. Although less accurate and powerful, these weapons still pose a threat to human life and Ukraine’s infrastructure. Russia’s 3M22 Zircon aeroballistic missiles, which continue to be produced in small albeit steady quantities, could add another five to 15 ballistic missiles per month.

Significant upside risk also comes from potential North Korean deliveries of KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles. Russia has received these missiles since late 2023 and has since helped North Korea upgrade them to increase their effectiveness. In August, reports indicated that a North Korean unit equipped with up to 120 missiles and six launchers was deploying to Russia. If committed to the winter campaign, this unit could add 20 to 30 missiles per month.

Overall, then, Ukraine could face an average of 130 to 190 ballistic missile projectiles per month over the four months. Of course, it is possible for Russia to concentrate ballistic missile attacks, rather than to spread them evenly, for example in January, when temperatures are generally the lowest.

In addition to the ballistic missile threat, Russia will likely be able to launch hundreds of heavy land-attack cruise missiles, including the 3M14 Kalibr and Kh-101, alongside thousands, potentially tens of thousands, of low-cost cruise missiles . While the latter are less lethal individually, the sheer volume Russia will likely deploy — not least because it now appears to manufacture indigenized versions of Chinese low-cost turbojet engines — constitutes a major threat. Moreover, even the relatively smaller warheads that equip low-cost cruise missiles can prove effective against softer, above-ground critical infrastructure.

Ukrainian preparations

Ukraine arguably enters the 2026/27 winter slightly better prepared than the one, but remains badly exposed to Russian missile strikes.

Ukraine has built up a gas reserve of 16 billion cubic meters, the highest level since 2020, despite heavy Russian strikes on Ukrainian gas facilities. Efforts to disperse power generation through small gas-fired units, which are harder for Russia to target than large power plants, have also advanced, but too slowly. The Energy Ministry reports around 1.8 GW of distributed gas-fired generation. Ukrenergo, the grid operator, puts decentralized capacity at only 0.7 GW. Even the Ministry’s higher figure, however, covers only a quarter of last winter’s peak power deficit of 7 GW.

Physical hardening of infrastructure has similarly progressed over the past year, although its ultimate impact may be limited. In September 2024, then-Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said that construction of Level III shelters, designed to withstand a direct hit from a heavy missile, had begun at 22 Ukrenergo substations. Little evidence suggests the work has advanced since. In October last year, Ukrenergo reported that none of its facilities were protected by Level III shelters. Reporting from July 2026 indicated that no new contracts for Level III shelters had been signed in either 2025 or 2026. As a result, most of Ukraine’s electricity grid remains vulnerable to Russian missile strikes.

Level II shelters, which provide protection against Shahed-type long-range drones (notably the Geran-2), appear to be in a better position. Around Kyiv, 49 percent of electricity infrastructure reportedly had this level of protection by the summer of this year. That said, as Russia shifts its focus away from long-range drones and toward faster, heavier Geran-4, Geran-5, and other low-cost cruise missiles, it remains highly uncertain whether these shelters will provide sufficient protection.

Ultimately, Ukraine will remain dependent on deliveries of interceptor capabilities, particularly for ballistic missile defense. According to official Ukrainian statements, however, U.S. deliveries of Patriot interceptors have averaged just 12 missiles per month. This is less than five percent of the number needed to effectively defend against the current scale of the Russian ballistic missile threat. Even with European partners scraping the bottom of the barrel to find more interceptors they can send from their own stocks, this is very unlikely to have been sufficient to build a meaningful reserve for the winter campaign.

Stockpiling of spare parts , alongside increased energy imports from EU countries, could help mitigate the effects of destroyed infrastructure. They will very likely not, however, be enough to prevent significant disruption to Ukraine’s energy grid.

What you can do to help Ukraine

It is difficult to stay optimistic when looking at this forecast. One thing that recently restored some of my faith was hearing my podcast co-host Anastasiia Lapatina talk her “Operation Battery” fundraiser on Mildly Alarmed .

Operation Battery began last year as a makeshift effort by Anastasiia and Benjamin Wittes to bring electricity to places that desperately needed it. They raised $130,000 and delivered dozens of high-capacity batteries and generators, each costing up to $3,000, without bureaucracy or administrative overhead.

In Anastasiia’s own words:

Last year, we bought large portable batteries and generators for more than 30 families with children in Kyiv. The batteries can power all basic necessities: lights, devices, a fridge, a kettle, a microwave, and even a washing machine on a cold cycle. They can also run a small space heater for several hours, which helped when temperatures plunged to extreme lows. My favorite project, however, was a large generator for Mamacita, a center on Kyiv’s left bank that combines a daycare with a space where mothers can take a few hours for themselves while their children attend classes in the same building. Last fall, the center shut down when its generator broke and the owner, a single mother, could no longer cover the energy costs. We bought a new generator and helped her reopen. Mothers still reach out to tell me how happy they are that we can give their children at least some sense of normalcy by providing an electricity-powered classroom. This year, we hope to have a similar impact, focusing on families with children and child-oriented institutions such as daycare centers.

Last year, we bought large portable batteries and generators for more than 30 families with children in Kyiv. The batteries can power all basic necessities: lights, devices, a fridge, a kettle, a microwave, and even a washing machine on a cold cycle. They can also run a small space heater for several hours, which helped when temperatures plunged to extreme lows. My favorite project, however, was a large generator for Mamacita, a center on Kyiv’s left bank that combines a daycare with a space where mothers can take a few hours for themselves while their children attend classes in the same building. Last fall, the center shut down when its generator broke and the owner, a single mother, could no longer cover the energy costs. We bought a new generator and helped her reopen. Mothers still reach out to tell me how happy they are that we can give their children at least some sense of normalcy by providing an electricity-powered classroom. This year, we hope to have a similar impact, focusing on families with children and child-oriented institutions such as daycare centers.

Russia is betting that targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and degrading the daily lives of its population will force Ukraine to give up. History suggests that these types of strategic bombing campaigns rarely achieve their objective, and this one is unlikely to be different. But Russia can still inflict tremendous suffering in the meantime.

This year, Anastasiia and Benjamin have formalized the effort as the Creek Chorus Foundation , a 501(c)(3) organization. I have joined their fundraiser, which aims to deliver as many batteries and generators as possible to people in need before Christmas. I have made an initial donation of $500, and I hope many of you will join me. Every contribution, however small, helps Ukrainians get through the winter. The foundation supports several projects, so please select Operation Battery when you donate if you would like to support this project specifically.

Donate to the Greek Chorus Foundation